In the Spanish criminal process — in preliminary proceedings and abbreviated procedure — the order that concludes the investigation and opens the door to the next phase must specify the punishable facts, the participation of the investigated persons, and the grounds that allow the parties to know exactly what is attributed to them.
Section 23 annulled the orders with which the magistrate had declared the investigation phase closed and had ordered the transformation of the procedure to aim for a potential trial by jury, considering that these resolutions «lack the necessary justification» and that, after a year and a half of investigation, it is not admissible to advance to the next phase without clearly stating the alleged facts, the plausible evidence, and the legal reasoning that justifies that decision.
The move by the Provincial Court does not, in itself, imply the dismissal of the case nor does it automatically invalidate all the proceedings already carried out. This clarification —included in the coverage of the resolution— is intended to prevent a domino effect that would restart everything from scratch, while at the same time preserving the core of the criticism: the process cannot move towards a trial phase without a motivation that allows the investigated persons to defend themselves clearly and the judicial system to maintain its own credibility.
In political terms, the ruling introduces a pause and removes immediate fuel from the scene of the «imminent trial», but in legal terms it leaves a classic lesson: in cases of high public sensitivity, the procedure is as important as the substance.
In strictly procedural terms, the answer is yes: when an appeals court annuls resolutions for lack of motivation and orders the reversal of proceedings, the competent authority to continue is the same instructing court, which must issue new resolutions in accordance with the indications of the Provincial Court.
In simple terms: the higher court is telling the judge that he cannot send a person to the antechamber of a trial —and even less to the specific jury route— without explaining, with a minimal and understandable motivation, what is attributed to them, why it fits certain crimes, and what investigative elements support that accusation.
The ruling focuses on a structural guarantee of the Spanish criminal process: the effective judicial protection, which includes the right to obtain duly motivated resolutions, especially when they have serious consequences.
What the Provincial Court demands is that, if the procedure advances, it does so with a rational and verifiable construction, avoiding jumps based on generic formulas. The practical scope of the ruling is also relevant: the nullity affects the orders that intended to open the jury route, but it does not necessarily erase what was done afterwards if those proceedings were authorized and carried out with formal coverage.
What is ordered is a «reversal» of proceedings: the case returns to the stage prior to the transformation of the procedure, so that the instructor must correct a central defect that, according to the magistrates, affects the basic rights of the investigated persons.
And it adds an important nuance: in complex crimes —such as those looming in this file, including influence peddling and embezzlement— a neutral description of facts is not enough; at least, an argumentative effort is needed that addresses typicity, unlawfulness, and participation.
The underlying question hovering over the debate is the one posed by the file itself: should the case «return» to the investigating judge and should he comply with the order of the higher court to, eventually, initiate a popular jury trial against Begoña Gómez?
The reversal opens several possible paths, all within the legal framework: Peinado can deepen the investigation to strengthen or discard hypotheses; he can issue a new order of transformation with reinforced motivation, delimiting facts, evidence, and legal framework; or he can, if he concludes that there is not sufficient basis, close the investigation in another way.
For the magistrates, it is not enough to invoke «plausibility» or to generically refer to previous assessments of the court itself: the instructor must expose the logical path that leads him to conclude that there is sufficient basis to continue towards a potential trial.
From a legal perspective, the criterion of the Provincial Court is based on a matrix idea: the transformation of the procedure is not an administrative formality, but a decision that delimits the object of the process and conditions the defense.
From now on, the future of the jury route will depend on whether the instructor is capable of reconstructing his decision with a robust motivation, anchored in facts and verifiable evidence, and whether that architecture withstands subsequent control by the parties and the courts.
